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Abstract 
In a previous study it was reported that patients with vmPFC damage had more tendency than 
people with no lesions to have more utilitarian responses, (i.e., deciding that is acceptable to 
make a harmful act in order to maximize overall utility) Moretto (2009). Our study included only 
healthy individuals in order to differentiate between the three types of conditions (personal 
moral, impersonal moral and non-moral dilemmas). The study included 21 participants that 
responded to personal as well as impersonal moral dilemmas while skin conductance response 
(SCR) was recorded as a physiological index of affective state. All participants were college 
students from University of Barcelona. As for gender, 11 of the subjects were female and 10 
were male. Mean age of the subjects was 23.09, ranging from 18 to 30. Later, the results showed 
that when decisions involve more emotions like in personal moral dilemmas, healthy individuals 
took more time to answer (Response Time) and their SCR was high only when reading a 
personal dilemma but on average their responses were non-utilitarian. These findings support the 
hypothesis that the proportion of utilitarian responses will be lower in the personal moral 
situations in comparison with impersonal moral and non-moral situations and that SCR would be 
higher in participants exhibiting fewer utilitarian choices than in those with a higher rate of 
utilitarian responses. 
Keywords:   skin-conductance response (SCR), personal dilemmas, emotions, utilitarian 
responses, response time (RT). 
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           Humans daily face all kinds of decisions which can vary between easy, average, or 
difficult. Sometimes, difficult decisions can reach a dilemmatic point. There are three different 
kinds of dilemmas, the personal moral dilemmas, impersonal moral dilemmas, and the non-moral 
dilemmas. Non-moral dilemmas are the most frequent dilemmas that we face in our daily life; for 
example, to buy a new mobile or to have your old mobile repaired for the same price, or to travel 
by car or train given a certain time limit. On the other hand, personal moral dilemmas are 
difficult to solve and to a certain extent they can block our functioning. Moreover, it is also not 
easy to take a decision when facing an impersonal moral dilemma but in this case the situation 
differs from that of a personal moral dilemma. In personal moral dilemmas more emotions are 
involved when seeing and taking decisions. On the other hand, in impersonal moral dilemmas 
people feel less involved on the emotional level. 
The classic trolley problem (Foot, 1978; Thomson, 1986) displays two contradicting moral 
scenarios, impersonal versus personal. The impersonal version (trolley dilemma), a bystander 
can use a switch to redirect a runway trolley away from five persons or onto a single person. In 
the personal version (footbridge dilemma), a bystander can push a man with a huge figure off of 
a bridge in front of a runway trolley in order to stop it from killing the five persons. Impersonal 
moral scenarios commonly show higher activation in brain areas combined with problem solving 
and deliberate reasoning (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and inferior lobule), whereas the personal 
moral scenarios show higher activation in brain areas that have been involved in emotion and 
social cognition (medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate gyrus) (Moretto et al., 2009). 
Decisions taken in situations involving personal moral decisions are called utilitarian, i.e., 
deciding that is acceptable to make harmful act in order to maximize overall utility). On the 
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contrary, decisions taken in situations involving non-utilitarian decisions are called 
deontological, i.e., certain rights and duties must be respected, regardless of the greater good that 
might otherwise be achieved.  
          Emotions play a big role in decision making especially when it has to do with personal 
moral dilemmas and when taking utilitarian choices (Carmona-Perera et al. 2013, Greene et al. 
2001, and Greene et al. 2004, Moretto et al. 2009, Naqvi et al. 2006,). In 2009, Moretto and 
colleagues found that the medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) area is responsible and involved in 
emotion and social cognition when presenting personal moral scenarios. Patients with adult-onset 
lesions in ventromedial prefrontal cortex are also found to make more “utilitarian choices” when 
presented with personal moral scenarios. One explanation of this result is that vmPFC patients 
lack automatic affective responses when approaching any personal moral violation. The increase 
of the rate of the “rationally appropriate” utilitarian choices happens when affective reactions 
dissolve (due to brain damage); in these cases principled reasoning aimed at maximizing benefits 
and minimizing costs may dominate (Greene, 2007; for a different  view, see also Moll & de 
Oliveira-Souza, 2007). Moreover, other studies (Damasio, 2005) showed that in addition to their 
inability to make advantageous decisions in real life, patients with vmPFC damage in general 
manifested a flat affect, and their ability to react to emotional situations was somehow damaged. All 
these findings show that patients with vmPFC damage usually make utilitarian decisions (Koenigs et 
al. 2007).  
Our study emphasizes the role of emotion whilst traditional theories emphasize reasoning 
and “higher cognition”. We will focus on healthy subjects, which is not the case in Moretto et al. 
(2009). The study will focus on healthy subjects in order to differentiate between the three types 
of dilemmas (personal moral, impersonal moral and non-moral).  
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          The aim of this study was to assess the role of emotions regarding personal moral 
decisions. In particular, we will focus on the emotional arousal expressed through Skin 
Conductance Response (SCR) in subjects faced with different types of dilemmatic situations.  
Mainly we had two hypotheses to test in our study: 
1. We expected that the proportion of utilitarian responses would be lower in the personal 
moral situations in comparison with impersonal moral and non-moral situations. 
2.  We predicted that SCR would be higher in participants exhibiting fewer utilitarian 
choices than in those with a higher rate of utilitarian responses.  
 
Method 
Participants 
          A convenience sampling (using a non-probabilistic method) of twenty one graduate and 
undergraduate students from the University of Barcelona (UB) participated in the present study 
(samples of between 20 and 30 subjects are usually considered appropriate for this type of 
experiments). As for gender, 11 of the subjects were female and 10 were male. Mean age of the 
subjects was 23.09, ranging from 18 to 30. This sample can be considered half heterogeneous 
due to the fact that the subjects come from different majors, perspectives, and different 
backgrounds. On the other hand, all subjects were students from UB.  
Materials 
          In the present study there were 15 personal moral dilemmas, 15 impersonal dilemmas, and 
15 non-moral (neutral) dilemmas, randomly selected from a battery of 60 dilemmas developed 
by Greene et al. (2001). A Spanish Adaptation for the battery was done by Carmona-Perera et al. 
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(2013): For the purposes of adaptation, the original questionnaire was translated into Spanish and 
then back-translated into English. Both versions were compared and there were no significant 
differences observed and both questionnaires were considered equivalent.   
          It is supposed that moral dilemmas obtain moral emotions, that is, emotions that respond to 
moral violations, or that motivate moral behavior, like shame, guilt, compassion, and pride; 
Haidt (2007), when as a matter of fact non-moral dilemmas don’t; Greene et al. (2001). Classic 
examples of non-moral dilemmas raised questions about whether to buy a new mobile or to have 
your old mobile repaired for the same price, or to travel by car or train given a certain time limit. 
Skin-Conductance Response (SCR) 
          SCR is an autonomic index of emotional arousal. For each participant, prewired Ag/AgCl 
electrodes filled with isotonic hypo-saturated conductant were attached to the surface of the 
middle and index fingertip of the non-dominant hand and were fixed firmly in place with a 
plaster. All the changes were recorded using a DC amplifier. While subjects were performing the 
moral judgment task being seated in front of the computer, the SCR was collected continuously 
and stored for later on analysis on another computer. The session began with a resting time 
making sure that the participants’ SCR was adjusted to the environment, and making sure that 
the electrodes were attached properly. Participants were asked to remain quiet and motionless as 
possible to avoid any confusion in later on analysis.  
Procedure 
         The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Barcelona. The 
participants were asked to sign an informed consent which explained the purpose and the 
procedure of this study was safe and that there was no danger to their health. It was kept totally 
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confidential; in the records and forms the participants’ information only included their initials 
and a code that represented each individual. Participants were paid 20 euros at the end of the 
session because it was a good way to motivate them to participate in the study.  
         The study took place at Bellvitge University Hospital because they have a well prepared 
lab for this study. It’s a cross-sectional study since it involves the analysis of data collected from 
a population, or a representative subset, at one specific point in time. It is a quasi-experimental 
study since it has a within control cases (non-moral dilemmas) that healthy individuals are asked 
to give responses to; univariate analysis (within-subject ANOVA). This study was done on 
healthy individuals in order to differentiate between the three types of conditions (personal 
moral, impersonal moral and non-moral dilemmas). In this study we had a deeper insight in the 
topic of interest which is the role of emotions in shaping moral judgment. It is partially 
quantitative since SCRs were recorded for each participant and the number of utilitarian 
responses given by each participant was analyzed.  
         Before they started, participants were asked to wash thoroughly their hands with soap and 
water and dry them well. Subjects sat on a huge and comfortable chair that was not easily moved 
and in front of a computer screen in a quiet and dimly lit room away from any distraction or 
sounds from outside the room. Participants were told that throughout the session there will be a 
small camera recording set on the right side corner of the room. Moreover, there were two 
interphones each in a room; one where the participant was having the session and one in the 
experimenter’s room; the interphone was easily used in case they needed anything. There were 
two electrodes that were fixed on the middle and the index finger of the non-dominant hand 
(SCR) and participants were asked to keep motionless except when answering to questions; they 
only used their dominant hand to choose one of the keypad buttons. Furthermore, there were 
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three computers, the first one was recording the session, the second screen recorded the SCR 
changes throughout the session, and the third screen showed randomly the selected dilemmatic 
scenarios simultaneously on both screens; the participant’s and the experimenter’s.  
           Instructions were well explained of how they will have to answer to the dilemmatic 
scenarios that will show on the screen. On the screen they faced a number of situations and when 
they finished reading each scenario they had to press the Spacebar to continue the task. First, a 
question appeared with the options of response YES/NO in black color. Second, after a few 
seconds, the words YES / NO appeared in red on the screen. They had to wait until the words 
YES / NO changed to red to make their choice. To answer they had to use their dominant hand 
by choosing either the left arrow for YES or the right arrow for NO. Once they had answered a 
question, another question appeared to check whether they understood the situation or no. 
Finally, they answered a question assessing the difficulty of each dilemmatic scenario by 
choosing the keypad numbers from 1 to 5. In total 45 scenarios were presented and after the 25
th
 
dilemmatic scenario a little pause was made (2 minutes approx.). The completion of the task took 
about 45-60 minutes. These 45 dilemmatic scenarios included 15 personal moral dilemmas, 15 
impersonal moral dilemmas and 15 non-moral dilemmas. These scenarios were presented in a 
random way to prevent any bias.                
          Furthermore, for the analysis part, each trial was divided into four separate time periods: 
the baseline, the 10-sec time prior preceding each dilemma; contemplation, the 30-sec time 
window during which participants viewed the dilemma; note this part was modified from 45-sec 
to 30-sec Moretto (2009); decision, the 5-sec time period set between presenting the dilemmatic 
question and answering (here the color of the question changed from black to red); understanding 
of the dilemma question, 8-sec time post-decision; difficulty of the dilemma from 1 to 5, the 5-
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sec time post last question. Finally, a blank screen appeared for 10-sec to prepare for the next 
dilemmatic question (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Different phases of a dilemmatic scenario. 
 
 
 
          
 
          Some changes that were done in our study with respect to that of Moretto’s (2009): we 
added the “understanding of the dilemma question” and the “difficulty of the dilemma question” 
in order to collect information about whether dilemmatic scenarios were relevant and easily 
understood. Some dilemmatic scenarios contained extreme situations and we wanted to check if 
the subjects had understood the situation correctly. In case they didn’t get the gist of the 
question, then we would change the dilemmatic scenario to make it more clear and to relate it to 
real life situations.   
 
Results 
          With respect to the first hypothesis, we expected to have less utilitarian choices for the 
personal moral situations in comparison with impersonal moral and non-moral (neutral) 
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situations, results can be seen in (Figure 2). The data were subjected to a one way ANOVA for 
dilemma (personal, impersonal, non-moral) as a within-subject factor. Moreover, we had 
significant results regarding the means of utilitarian choices for the personal moral situations in 
comparison with impersonal moral and non-moral (neutral) situations. The results were 
statistically significant (F (2, 38) = 20.079, p = .000). Whereas, the difference between the other 
two situations (impersonal and neutral) was not significant (p = .472). 
 
Figure 2. Means of  
utilitarian responses to 
personal, impersonal, and 
non-moral (neutral) dilemmas 
in healthy individuals  
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Response Time (RT) was high when taking personal choices in contrast to the other types 
of dilemmas the impersonal and neutral (see Figure 3). The results were significant (F (2, 37) = 
3.909, p = .029). The results showed that the difference between the impersonal and neutral was 
not significant (p = .477), whereas the difference between the personal and the other two types of 
dilemmas (impersonal and neutral) was significant (p = .011).                     
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Figure 3. RT in (ms) 
before a utilitarian response 
during the three types of 
dilemmas(impersonal, neutral and 
personal).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                    
                                                                                                                                                                                            
          Furthermore, during contemplation (when reading), the participants generated larger SCRs 
of personal moral dilemmas that were associated with utilitarian responses/judgments (Figure 4). 
In addition, on average individuals selected non-utilitarian choices in personal moral dilemmas. 
Besides the well-formed graph, our findings showed non-significant results   (F (2, 40) = 2.777, 
P = .074). The difference between the impersonal and neutral was not significant (p = .189) and 
the difference between the personal and the other two types of dilemmas (impersonal and 
neutral) was not significant (p = .059).  
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Figure 4. SCR when  
reading the three types of 
dilemmas (personal, impersonal  
and neutral).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
 
 
A previous study (Moretto 2009) found that patients with vmPFC damage with respect to healthy 
individuals were more likely and had the tendency to choose moral violations in order to 
maximize good consequences (i.e., the utilitarian response). Our results completely agreed with 
the previous data regarding the point that healthy individuals had less utilitarian choices for the 
personal moral situations in comparison with impersonal moral and non-moral (neutral) 
situations; whilst in patients with vmPFC damage that case was the opposite (more utilitarian 
choices when encountered with personal moral situations). Response Time (RT) was higher 
when taking personal choices in contrast to the other types of dilemmas the impersonal and 
neutral. On the other hand, patients with vmPFC damage seemed to have no hesitation when 
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answering to personal dilemmas. Our present study was designed to test the pattern of skin-
conductance changes that is used as an autonomic index of individuals’ affective responses, 
combining personal versus impersonal moral judgments. Furthermore, during contemplation 
(when reading), the participants generated larger SCRs of personal moral dilemmas that were 
associated with utilitarian responses/judgments. In addition, on average individuals selected non-
utilitarian choices in personal moral dilemmas. We can say that the SCR signal could not only 
aid as an affective signal that warns us to the moral consistency of a rule of violation (in some 
cases might be serious violent act against others), but also as a teaching signal targeted to 
decreasing the likelihood of moral unacceptable behaviors. 
Like any other study, this research has certain limitations, including: (1) low mean scores due to 
a general (non-clinical) sample; (2) a small sample size. However, these limitations would have 
restricted, rather than enhanced, our ability to find statistically significant results in part of our 
findings. At all events, these limitations should not distract from the fact that we have 
experimentally examined that emotions are involved in making moral judgments. 
In conclusion, the present results suggest that emotions play an important role in guiding moral 
decisions about whether deciding that it is acceptable to make harmful act in order to maximize 
overall utility or to accept that certain rights and duties must be respected, regardless of the 
greater good that might otherwise be achieved (on average healthy individuals had more non-
utilitarian responses and few of which were utilitarian).       
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